Category Archives: elections

Ballots, Blocks, and Bullets (and Bulldozers) – The Vote in Eastern Turkey

Since the referendum last Sunday, there has been much discussion over the relatively high support for the YES-vote in Turkey’s predominantly-Kurdish Eastern part of the country. To give a quick visualization of it, the below graph on the left-hand side shows the difference between the number of YES votes in the referendum and the number of AKP votes in the last (November 2015) parliamentary election, by geographic (NUTS-1) regions. (These numbers are not official data so maybe updated slightly).

The largest increase can be observed in Southeast Anatolia, but Central East and Northeast Anatolia are also among the top regions where the AKP(‘s amendments) gained the largest increase in votes. These three Anatolian regions added circa 570,000 votes (the smaller number reported in my previous post is from narrower subset of provinces) corresponding to ca 38% of the added votes nationally. This is especially noteworthy given that this area corresponds to just under 15% of the electoral population.

Another striking aspect of this graph is that, whereas most non-Eastern regions experienced increases in the number of total votes (and a somewhat smaller increase in AKP votes), the experience in the East was quite different. Here, the number of votes either declined overall or were marginal in comparison to the added votes for the AKP. Thus, AKP’s proposed constitutional amendments gained additional votes in a region where the number of total votes declined.

Within the Eastern regions, in the right-hand graph, Diyarbakir and Sanliurfa added the largest amounts of new votes for the AKP, followed by Van and Mardin. This by itself is unsurprising, as these are also (bar Gaziantep) the most populous provinces in the region. Yet even if one further includes Gaziantep, these account for just over half of all added AKP votes from the East. The rest is from the more peripheral provinces, like Sirnak, Agri, Hakkari etc.

A number of factors have been brought forth to try to explain this.

The government position is essentially that the pro-AKP swing represent changes in inhabitants’ political preferences, and that by “making a very clear distinction between the Kurds and the PKK, President Erdoğan and the government have won the Kurdish confidence again.”

The major opposition party in the region contends that these dynamics are an outcome of the government’s actions to curtail its ability to campaign in the region:

“the government embarked on a relentless campaign against the country’s largest pro-Kurdish bloc, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and its sister party, the Democratic Regions Party (DBP). At least 10,000 Kurdish lawmakers, officials and supporters remain behind bars over thinly supported terror links. They include the HDP’s co-chairs, Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdag, and 12 fellow HDP parliamentarians, one of whom was arrested after the referendum. DBP’s Co-chair Sebahat Tuncel is also in jail together with 85 mayors elected on the party’s ticket in the southeast, where 83 DBP-run municipalities have been taken over by government administrators.”

As such, voters might perceive the HDP to have fewer means to end the fighting, perhaps believing it is only the government that can stop it. As Bloomberg reported a village elder saying “the HDP can do nothing for us now, and we will give our votes to whomever can help us.

This could also have implications for the practice of “block voting” , where local elites determine how their constituency votes.

The fighting has further resulted in extensive internal displacement of large numbers of voters following heavy fighting and the destruction of significant parts of cities like Sur in Diyarbakir, Nusaybin, Yuksekova and Cizre, resulting in dislocation of “people who used to provide 90% of the HDP votes in those cities”.

It is also possible that some voter segments who might not normally vote for either the AKP or the HDP, such as the Huda-Par movement, voted for the AKP(‘s proposals) in this election.

Finally, the security presences in the region has arguably increased in the past two years, and so part of the increase in AKP votes could be due to “security personnel who cast their ballots in situ.”

First of all, it is clear that the voting dynamics of the East are very different from that in the rest of the country. Similar to my previous post, the below graph plot histograms of the YES share vote distribution in 2017 against the AKP vote share distribution in November 2015, all at the ballot box level.

 

Figure 2

Whereas in the part of Turkey outside the (C/N/S) Eastern Anatolia region the rightwards push in the mass appears to be rather smooth, in the East the main changes have occurred at the edges of the distribution. The prevalence of the Never-AKPers, who vote close-to or never for the AKP, that have existed going back at least the last four elections, have disappeared and have instead been replaced by a significant share of Always-AKPers, who tend to vote homogeneously for the AKP.

Yet, as the below graph shows this doesn’t seem to be block votes moving from one edge of the distribution to the other, as the disappearance of the Never-AKPers (Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Sirnak, Tunceli, Van, Sirnak, and Van) is observed in different provinces than where the appearance of the Always-AKPers occur (Erzurum and Sanliurfa).

Figure 3

This graph shows the difference in the frequency of the YES vote share  in the referendum and the AKP vote share in November 2015. At the bottom of each panel, with a compressed scale, is the frequency of the 2017 YES vote share.

Block voting could still occur, it just doesn’t seem offer an explanation for the transfer of mass between the edges of the distribution, as these seem to be driven by different processes in different provinces

As for the Always-AKPers, in Sanliurfa this could potentially have to do with increases in security forces there. But has there been similar increases in security forces in Erzurum too? (Not to my knowledge). Also, it is likely that security forces have become more prevalent in the other southeastern provinces too, but this phenomenon does not show up there. In particularly Sanliurfa, the magnitude of these Always-AKPers is large. Boxes with between 99-100 % or more voting for the AKP increased by 246 boxes, and given the province’s average number of valid votes of 253 per box, this translates into 62,238 votes, or roughly 77 percent of the added votes the AKP gained compared to the previous election (80,453) in the province. In Erzurum, there were 98 more ballot boxes (compared to the previous election) with more than 99% AKP votes. Given an average number of valid votes per box of 192.7, this implies 18,885 votes affected, roughly 75% of the votes the AKP gained compared to the previous election (25,232 added votes).

The disappearance of the Never-AKPers affects a larger area in the East. The change in frequency for the previously mentioned provinces (Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Sirnak, Tunceli, Van, Sirnak, and Van) with sharp drops in frequency for the 0-1% bin AKP vote share was 896 ballot boxes, and given an average votes per box of 212, this affects roughly 189,952 voters, or around  72% of the additional votes AKP gained (264,064) compared to the last election in these provinces.

One thing should be clear at this point: whatever factor is driving the Never-AKPers and the Always-AKPers, they have a significant bearing on the magnitude of the change in AKP/YES votes between the current and previous election.

Is the Disappearance of Never-AKPers driven by Conflict-Driven Displacement?

Whereas I have a hard time explaining the appearance of the Always-AKPers in two provinces, the broader disappearances of the Never-AKPers may have something to do with the conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK, particularly with regards to the significant internal displacement that has followed as a result.

It is arguably safe to assume that the neighborhoods in Eastern Turkey least likely to vote for the AKP are also those that have experienced the highest conflict intensity so far. For example, it should come as no surprise that most neighborhoods in Nusaybin and Cizre — where whole quarters of the cities have been razed — have tended to vote almost exclusively for the pro-Kurdish HDP (in November 2015 the vote shares were circa 9 and 5 % respectively).

Consequently, is there a link between initial political preferences (which are also the places that  and change in voter turnout?

The below graph plots the correlation between the total votes cast in 2017 at the neighborhood-level (muhtarlık) against the previous election’s AKP vote share. Each orange circle represents a local mean in 2-percent bins with local quadratic smoothers with associated 95% confidence intervals overlaid in blue, by super-region in columns and by election in rows. (I’ve labeled the regions of Central/North/South Eastern Turkey simply as “Eastern Turkey”.)

Figure 4

The relationship between the AKP vote share in the past election and the percentage change in total votes cast (between current and past election) was roughly similar in the East and non-East up until 2017. In 2017, the relationship looks quite different comparing the two regions. For the non-East, except for the bottom three percentiles (orange circles) of the AKP vote share, the relationship is roughly linear and negative. Yet in the East, it’s positive at lower levels of the previous election’s AKP vote share and flat at higher levels. Whereas, in the non-Eastern part of Turkey, higher initial-AKP-support areas saw larger turnout declines, in the Eastern part the lower initial-AKP-support areas saw larger declines, but only for neighborhoods where the AKP was getting a minority share of the vote. This non-linearity in the relationship in the East suggests there is some process that affected the low-AKP-voting areas in the East to a greater extent than higher-AKP-voting areas in that same region.

Many of the neighborhoods with both the lowest initial AKP support as well as the largest turnout declines appear to be among those who have also experienced large-scale fatalities, crippling 24-hour curfews, as well as material destruction of the urban space. The disappearance of the Never-AKPers, and the increase in the number of AKP votes in this area, thus appears intimately linked to the forces that drove people out of their homes, or whatever was left of them. The extent to which this is driven by forced out-migration, or the risk of future out-migration, is however beyond the scope of this post.

 

The Curious Case of the Vanishing Never-AKPers in Southeastern Turkey

There are a number of striking features of Sunday’s referendum in Turkey, which resulted in a narrow victory (51.4% being the official “YES” vote share at the time of writing this blog post) for the constitutional amendment proposed by the government.

There are, however, numerous challenges to the result, both with regards to the environment in which it was carried out as well as more direct accusations of election-day irregularities. Going through the election data is probably going to keep many people busy for the next couple of days weeks months. For now, I wanted to highlight one particular phenomenon which struck me as interesting.

At a first glance, when plotting the vote share distribution of the YES vote at the ballot box level was that the “Never-AKPers” were gone. These Never-AKPers are voting groups that have extremely few or literally zero votes for the AKP. In past elections, they have been quite noteworthy. The below illustrates this by plotting the distribution of the AKP vote shares for the 2011, June 2015, and November 2015 parliamentary elections and in the bottommost graph the YES vote share in Sunday’s referendum.

bbdistr

Essentially, the fat left tail (i.e. the ballot boxes with next to zero AKP votes), which stands out in the previous three elections is almost entirely gone in 2017. What happened? Did the areas where the AKP was the least popular suddenly have a change of heart?

These Never-AKPers tend to be, with some exceptions of course, voters in the predominantly Kurdish southeastern region of Turkey. And so, in these areas, there ought to have been a vote swing from those previously voting for the Kurdish party HDP in past elections to a YES vote for the AKP government’s proposed constitution (which the HDP has stringently opposed) in the current election. Interestingly, the AKP may have gained as much as 450,000 (preliminary and subject to possible change) votes in the Southeast compared to November 2015, corresponding to roughly 10% of votes of the entire region. Especially since turnout was significantly lower this time around, by my estimates by some 150,000 (preliminary and subject to possible change).

The degree to which there has been a vote swing in the southeastern areas to the AKP can be seen in the below boxplot graph, which plots the distribution of the district-level (ilce) log difference between the number of votes received by AKP (or the YES side) in any of the  June 2015 November 2015, or 2017 elections  and the number of AKP votes in the previous election.

The graph shows AKP losing votes in the June 2015 election, especially in the Southeastern region, to then experience a sharper-than-the rest swing back in November that same year. In the last 2017 referendum election, this region is again pushing further toward the AKP(‘s constitution), even as the rest of Turkey experiences somewhat of a reversion to the mean. For the vote swing in the Southeast in 2017, the distribution is also clearly skewed towards positive an AKP-swing, partly driven by a number of outliers.

Two things are odd with this: the first is that the Southeast region experiences a roughly equally large (if you care about the median) or a larger (if you care about the mean) pro-AKP vote swing than in November 2015, just as the rest of Turkey experiences the opposite. The second is that the distribution of the AKP vote swing is so much more skewed toward the AKP than any group in any of the previous elections. (In fact, there are only observations in the “outer fence” on top, which makes it stand out among the other distributions.)

There are no commensurate swings in either registered voters or votes cast, as shown in the middle- and right-hand graphs.

This doesn’t have to be anything peculiar or strange if the pro-AKP swing in the Southeast is coming from “latently” pro-AKP areas (areas that were already pro-AKP in the region. Nor does the above graph by itself offer any link to the first graph I showed of the disappeared Never-AKPers.)

However, it turns out this is not the case. In fact, the largest pro-AKP swings appear to come from the least pro-AKP areas in the region. This can be seen in the below graph, which plots, again, the log pro-AKP vote swing against the log number of AKP votes in the past election for both the Southeastern districts (red) and the rest of Turkey (blue).

Note two things about the left-hand and middle graphs: the largest swings away and back to the AKP occurs mostly among the mid-range of AKP voters in the southeast (in red), not the very least AKP-supporting districts. The districts that were already not at all voting for the AKP in the previous elections tend to remain this way. That is, until last Sunday. Here, almost the entire lower end of the distribution is experiencing some of the largest pro-AKP vote swings in the entire distribution. This was unexpected.

But it gets even more surprising when one investigates which provinces and districts are undergoing this political change of hearts. In November 2015, it was predominantly the provinces of Agri, Igdir, Mus, Sanliurfa, Van,  and even a few districts of Diyarbakir that swung the most toward the AKP. In 2017, however, the biggest pro-AKP changes occurred in Tunceli, Hakkari, Sirnak, and Diyarbakir. The three former provinces here are among the worst affected by the war between the PKK and the Turkish state.

It gets still a bit stranger once we look at which districts these are. The Diyarbakir district at the 1.5 point in the right-hand graphs is none other than Lice, which is as much a Never-AKPer as you’re ever going to find. Among the other districts topping the pro-AKP swing distribution are Cizre, Yuksekova, two heavily damaged districts from the military conflict, and Uludere, the scene of the infamous Roboski strike.

The voters in the strongholds of the HDP, where sympathies for the PKK and antipathy toward the Turkish state is among the highest in the country, have truly chosen a peculiar time to switch to the AKP. What could possibly explain how such strongholds of the pro-Kurdish movement would have waited until 2017 to start voting for the AKP?

Security?

One possibility could be that the composition of voters has significantly changed in some Kurdish areas since November 2015. For example, if there’s been an increased inflow of security personnel who register to vote in these areas, that could be one explanation.

At an aggregate level, there doesn’t seem to have been any larger positive changes in either votes cast, as can be seen below, but there does seem to have been an uptick in registered voters in 2017 compared to the previous election.

Most of the Kurdish areas saw decreases in votes cast, and no or small increases in registered voters. This is, in a way, also somewhat interesting. Thus, either any inflow of security personnel was too small to really effect the voting population, or the inflow of security personnel would have to have been evenly matched with the outflow of local residents fleeing the conflict. This would then beg the question of how this group of displaced citizens were given the change to vote elsewhere.

Is the Never-AKPer phenomenon by itself a sign of an irregularity?

Above, I make make no judgement as to whether the initial existence of the Never-AKPers is by itself a problem for the elections or not. Perhaps these are simply an outcome of very homogenous political preferences in some areas. Or perhaps not, in which case there’s a Devil’s Advocate kind of argument to be made:

(I am also grateful to a number of midnight-oil-burning DMs from Alex)

Alternatively, could a switch in allegiance of the local elites, effectively tribe leaders, explain the phenomenon? As I wrote just after the June 2015 elections, the HDP’s success was to a large extent brought about by it successfully gaining the support of non-core voters among more religiously conservative Kurds. At the time, there was some reporting on HDP’s specific campaigns to win over large tribal communities in Kurdish Turkey (see here, here, and here). This could have resulted in a vote swing of so-called “block votes” , whereby “persuading only the tribal chief, community leaders secure the backing of thousands of people.”  In the November 2015 elections, there was a significant reversal in this non-core group of Kurds, most likely as the government managed to regain their support.

But before getting into more details on this, let’s take another look at the data. In this case, I’ve split the data into two groups, one including ballot boxes belonging to provinces in Turkey’s Southeastern region, and the second one including all others. The below graph is the same as the first one above, but split along these two subgroups

Although there appears to be some Never-AKPers even outside of the Southeastern provinces, I will focus mostly on the Southeast where they tend to be much more common. The left-hand side panel shows that 10-15 percent of all ballot boxes had little or no AKP votes in the June and November elections, with a smaller share in 2011 and, as previously documented, very few such cases in 2017.

Which provinces are driving this result can be gleaned from the below graph which plots the same kind of plot but for each province (in the Southeast).

In several cases (Agri, Mus, Siirt, Sirnak, Van etc) the high densities at the very lowest part of the distribution seem to occur almost exclusively in the two 2015 elections. In the June 2015 elections, for example, Hakkari saw roughly half its ballot boxes having little or no AKP votes, and the corresponding percentages for Agri was 25%, 15% in Diyarbakir, 20% in Mardin, 40% in Mus and Sirnak, 60% in Tunceli, and 20% in Van.

If this phenomenon was due to pro-HDP irregularities, occurring under an absence of state control, one would expect these to disappear in the November 2015 election, as the state security forces reasserted control over the region. Although this seems to have occurred in some provinces like Agri, Bingol, and even to some extent Siirt, in most others it continued. Similarly, if the very high densities of low-AKP-voting areas were a result of of block voting via traditional tribes, then shouldn’t the high densities at the lower end of the distribution have disappeared entirely in November?

In 2017, however, the Never-AKP phenomenon is entirely gone. Curiously, both in Bingol, Sanliurfa, and even to a degree in Bitlis and Siirt, we now observe the opposite, high densities at the very top of the distribution. And so, under the assumption that Never-AKP ballot boxes were an outcome of some form of anti-AKP irregularities under state absence, this would then imply that the reassertion of state control lead to Always-AKPers, which ought to then constitute pro-AKP irregularities. But the incongruence between the timing of state reassertion of control and the Never-AKPers lingering on even afterwards suggest tribal block voting and irregularities with a pro-HDP bias are unlikely to be the main driver of why the Never-AKPers disappeared.

Overall, however, I suspect there are multiple factors at work. It would be naive to claim that there couldn’t have existed any irregularities benefiting the HDP in previous elections, nor that local elites and block votes don’t matter at all. And if the AKP has been able to stop or harness such practices, it would then be one more institutional feature of Turkey that it has successfully been able to turn to its advantage. (In particular, the distribution for Sanliurfa in 2017 looks rather concerning.) The Southeast remains its poorest region, and if there was any area in Turkey where electoral fraud would be most likely to go unnoticed, it would most likely be here.

Meanwhile, I don’t think one should underestimate factors I have not discussed very much here, such as the internally displacement of large numbers of the population or the possibility that local residents might simply vote for the constitution in the hope that the political instability would end. There is also the issue of why there are Never-AKPers outside of the Southeast. These factors, however, would require a post of their own.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Kinky Voting and Turkey’s ‘Sultans of Swing’

There are several interesting phenomena evident in the last Turkish elections. Whereas my previous post dealt with a couple of these, in this one I want to focus more on a specific region of Turkey, namely the Southeastern provinces, sometimes also referred to as the Kurdish provinces. (There’s a discussion to be had about what distinguishes Kurdish- from non-Kurdish provinces, but for the below analysis, I will semi-arbitrarily include Diyarbakir, Sanliurfa, Bitlis, Bingol, Mardin, Mus, Agri, Igdir, Batman, Sirnak, Siirt, Van, and Tunceli in the group of Kurdish provinces).

As I wrote back in June, this region saw a significant voter swing from the AKP to HDP, going a long way to helping the latter over the ten percent threshold required for participation in the Turkish parliament. In the most recent election, some of these voters appear to have switched back. The upper panel of the below graph shows differences in the AKP vote share between both November 2015 and June 2015, as well as June 2015 and June 2011, for the Kurdish and Other provinces. In June 2015, the vote shift away from AKP for the region was almost twice as large in relative terms as that in the rest of Turkey, whereas in November 2015, the relative swing in favor of AKP was larger than for the rest of the country.

Another distinguishing factor of vote patterns in the Kurdish provinces is not only that the Kurdish provinces exhibit larger changes in turnout from election to election (see the bottom panel of the below figure) but also that whereas in the most recent election the rest of Turkey experienced an increase in turnout compared to June, the Kurdish provinces experienced a decrease. Still, even though the average change in turnout was negative, there is still plenty of variation (which can be seen from the red curves, compared to the blue curves, being “shorter and fatter”), and a significant number of the neighborhoods in the latter provinces experienced significant positive increase in turnout.

Undoubtedly, one possible explanation for the decrease in turnout and the increase in AKP vote share could be the ongoing conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK.  The decrease in turnout could be due to safety concerns in conflict-affected areas, which might be more likely to affect pro-HDP neighborhoods, and might also be correlated with a shift to the AKP as a means to achieve stability for some.

In this case, we would expect an overall negative relationship between the change in turnout and the change in AKP vote shares between the November and June elections. As I showed back in June, the large increases then observed in HDP vote shares in provinces like Agri, Igdir, Mus, Batman, Diyarbakir etc, were also accompanied by substantial increases in turnout.

This relationship, however, changed in the November elections, as can be seen in the below graph which plots (local averages of equally-sized bins for) differences in party vote shares against differences in turnout between November and June.

kink_parties

The main thing to note is the apparent “kink” in the relationship for the AKP and HDP (and to a certain extent in the MHP) graphs. In both of these graphs, the slope of the line appears to change sharply at the zero turnout change point. For AKP, the party appears to benefit not only the larger the fall in turnout is, but it also larger the increase in turnout is. (The HDP graph has the almost exact inverse relationship, which is unsurprising since in the Kurdish provinces votes tend to go either to AKP or HDP and so a positive change in the former implies a negative change in the latter.)

Before I go any further with this, an important question to ask is why this might matter. It matters because this kink is not to be seen in the previous election, nor is to be seen for the rest of Turkey in either the current or past election. In order to demonstrate this, I below compare differences in AKP vote shares and differences in turnout for Kurdish versus the Rest of Turkey, for the November and the June election respectively. Also, to make the analysis somewhat more robust I use the residuals from regressing the difference in party vote shares on lagged levels of turnout, AKP vote share, and the log number of registered voters in a neighborhood. As before, each dot represents the local average of equally-sized bins.

kink_parties2

Here, it is clear how the slope changes only for the Kurdish provinces, and how it is the neighborhoods with positive turnout change that exhibit a peculiar slope; in November they exhibit a positive relationship with the change in AKP vote shares, whereas in June it was negative.

One possibility could be that this reversal of the slope does not represent a kink but rather some non-linearity that may have come about for a number of reasons that are unknown, yet completely innocuous. Moreover, the non-Kurdish provinces suggest that a non-linear relationship per se is not necessarily something strange. So how do we know this is actually a real “abnormal” kink and not just some “normal” non-linearity.

Fortunately, we can test for the presence of a kink at zero turnout change using Regression Discontinuity methods, which have relatively recently been extended to allow for discontinuous changes in the first derivative of the outcome (rather than the level of it). This can also easily be implemented with local linear RD models with optimal bandwidths using the methods and tools developed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (hereby CCT, see here, and here).

Using RD shifts the focus entirely on the cutoff, which in this case is the zero turnout change, and allows us to answer the question of whether an infinitesimal change in the “running variable” (here the change in turnout) results in a discontinuous change in the first derivative of the outcome variable.

(Note that whereas RD designs are usually employed to infer causal effects, here I’m merely interested in whether the first-derivative changes in a statistically significant way.)

Below, I show a simple RD kink plot with data in bins and a quartic polynomial fit on each side of the zero turnout change cutoff.

kink_estimate

The slope appears to change discontinuously at the threshold, and formal testing using CCT’s rdrobust command in Stata results in a statistically significant estimate of 2.6 (the left-hand slope is -0.26 and the right-hand slope is 2.35). On the right-hand side of the cutoff, this represents a large effect, as a one percentage point increase in the difference in turnout corresponds roughly to a 2.4 percentage point increase in the difference in AKP vote share.

Sure, this may seem odd, but why would this necessarily imply anything irregular? And is there a way to link this analysis with that in my previous post?

The previous post focused on the last digit distributions of party counts, and one of the main findings in that last digit distributions changed character in the Kurdish provinces between the November and June elections. One interpretation (although there may be other ones too) of this is not just that these last digits are from different distributions, but also that this implies manipulation.

So a logical follow-up related to the above analysis is whether we can observe a discontinuous jump in the distribution of the last digit at around zero turnout change. Similar to the outcome in the past post, I use the mean of the last digit, with the difference here being that the outcome variable is the neighborhood-level average of the party vote count’s last digit across all ballot boxes within that neighborhood. And as this mean should arguably be flat, I look for the existence of jumps in the level as opposed to the first derivative as above.

Below, I illustrate the RD design for discontinuous jumps in the last digit for AKP and the HDP’s vote counts for November and June respectively. Under each graph, I also show the RD estimate and its associated standard error and optimal bandwidth used in the estimation (again using the rdrobust command).

In this case, and as opposed to that in the previous post, the test is not whether the last digit distribution changes across time but whether it changes at zero turnout change in each of the November and June elections respectively. The stipulated assumption here is therefore that, absent manipulation, we should not observe any discontinuous jumps at the cutoff around zero turnout change.

digit_RD

As can be seen form the above figures, the AKP last digit exhibits a statistically significant jump around the cutoff in the November election, with an estimate of around -0.7. which corresponds to roughly an 18 percent change relative to the mean just to the left of the cutoff. Again, this is a rather significant effect even in terms of magnitude.

In the June elections, the AKP last digit also exhibits a negative RD estimate although it’s somewhat smaller in magnitude. As for the HDP, there is no statistically significant jump at the cutoff and estimates tend to be much closer to zero. Consequently, to the extent that a discontinuous jump here implies manipulation of votes, it’s only occurring for the AKP’s votes.

One mechanism which could drive the above result that comes to mind is if the AKP, for a subset of neighborhoods, was able to “add” AKP voters in such significant numbers so as that all of the neighborhoods in which this occurred resulted in positive turnout relative to the June election. If, in turn, these were manipulated votes and their numbers decided by an individual as opposed to a random process, this could explain the jump in the last digit distribution at the cutoff.

Nonetheless, as with the previous statistical analysis of Turkish election I’ve done on this blog, the by now usual disclaimer applies: these statistical relationships could be considered consistent with some form of voter manipulation, but they are by themselves not necessarily proof of it. And just because I have not been able to imagine any more innocuous explanations for these kinks and jumps doesn’t mean they don’t exist.

Digit Tests and the Peculiar Election Dynamics of Turkey’s November Elections

Sunday’s elections in Turkey were a landslide for the ruling AKP. Its vote share rose nearly 9 percentage points from what it received in June. One interpretation is that AKP’s political strategy since its summer defeat has paid off, a chilling evaluation of one that has at times seemed both divisive and violent, not to mention authoritarian.

As in last elections, much of the change in voting seems to have occurred among nationalist as well as Kurdish voters, with this election seeing a difference of priority among them. Whereas June’s election was HDP’s to win, this one appears to have been to a large extent the nationalist MHP’s to lose. As the below figure shows, plotting the difference in vote share between November and June, the AKP’s gain appears to come predominantly at the expense of MHP. In some other cases, the vote swing seems to be driven by voters in Kurdish provinces leaving HDP for AKP (likely the poor and pious I have discussed in this blog before).

provdiffshr

Part of the story could be explained by turnout. After all, several provinces show significant changes in turnout compared to the June elections. Several Kurdish provinces like Agri, Batman, Hakkari show substantial reductions in turnout, likely a result of the ongoing conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state.turnoutprov

Election night was particularly embarrassing to Turkish pollsters who in unison (almost, at least) were predicting a repeat of the June elections. In fact, using the mean and standard deviations of this sample of pollsters, predictions were off by an incredible 4.9 standard deviations.

Continue reading

How Turkey’s social conservatives won the day for HDP

(Note: This post has been updated to 1) add Istanbul to the provinces where Kurdish parties were active in 2011, 2) adding the other large cities Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, and Adana to the neighborhood-level analysis, and 3) adding graph of partial correlation between Refah vote share in 1995 and HDP vote swing in 2015.)

Given yesterday’s tumultuous election in Turkey, I thought it might be a good idea illustrate using the data available what just happened.

There’s the obvious: AKP lost about 10 percentage points of its vote share, and the Kurdish-and-what-not HDP received around 13 percentage points, pushing it above the ten percent threshold, allowing it to take seats in parliament – as far as I know, the first time a political party with such a clear pro-Kurdish constituency has done so. This means AKP’s seats in parliament fell from the 327 it won in 2011 down to 258.

Then there’s what it all means, which there’s no way I can discuss in one post. Instead I want to focus specifically here on the HDP and what kind of electorate brought it above the ten percent threshold.

Some herald Demirtaş. the HDP, and its electoral success as the comeback of the left or liberalism (here and here), noting amongst others his supportive stance toward the LGBT community as well as his background as a human rights lawyer. It is not for nothing that many refer to him as “Kurdish Obama”.

A following question is then to what extent HDP’s electoral success is a manifestation of the voting power of progressives and liberals in Turkey?

Despite talk of “borrowed votes”, i.e. strategic voting by (I assume) predominantly traditional CHP supporters, an initial look at the election suggests that what pushed HDP into parliament was a shift among traditional right-wing voters – the socially conservative Kurdish communities in the East and some living in the large cities who abandoned the AKP for the HDP.

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Pandora’s Ballot Box and Turkey: Kurdish edition

I recently (finally) had the chance to take a look at the Turkish presidential elections data from August 2014, with the aim of comparing some of the measures of election irregularities I documented from the earlier local elections in March of the same year. The analysis from those elections were essentially a snapshot of potential irregularities with little to say about how this evolved over time.

What I focused on last year was the rather peculiar degree with which the share of invalid ballots appeared to be positive correlated, at the ballot-box level within voting stations, with AKP vote shares (or rather the vote share difference between the AKP and the largest opposition party). Now, with the presidential elections data, I can compare how this correlation differs between that election and the local elections. As for the interpretation of the correlations, here’s what I wrote in April last year:

“An obvious question mark in the analysis is to what extent any correlation represents systematic mistakes, not systematic fraud. Suppose the AKP has a higher support among the illiterate who are more likely to make mistakes when voting. In this case, we would not be surprised if there was a correlation between invalid ballots and AKP support. An explanation would be that those more likely vote for the AKP are also those more likely to make voting mistakes and have their ballots declared invalid. Given the large difference across districts in the large cities in Ankara and Istanbul, one can easily imagine this as a plausible explanation for the simple unconditional correlations.

It is here that the fixed effects used in the previous analysis becomes crucial, i.e.  including fixed effects (FEs) to regressions of vote shares on invalid ballots control for all factors that vary across the FEs. Adding FEs for districts (Ilce) means we’re only looking at variation across ballot boxes within districts, whereas adding FEs for voting station means only looking at variation across ballot boxes within voting stations.

When doing this, although voters going to the same station to vote may still differ along several characteristics, it is much more difficult to argue that this systematically affect their likelihood of making mistakes in voting. The strength of the FEs is thus not that they control for everything, but that they reduce these differences to the point where it is less likely that the remaining differences represent an competing explanation for the correlation.

Furthermore, to the extent that this represent fraud, one would expect the relationship between AKP’s vote share and invalid ballots to be stronger in races with significant competition and less likely in races where the AKP was safe. (For the obvious reason that there is little return to engaging in fraud in races where you’re expected to win without fraud.)”

Below I show such correlations between the AKP’s vote share and the invalid share of ballots, with red representing the August presidential elections and blue representing the local elections. These are essentially the same kind of graphs as the first set of ones I posted here, the main difference being that I now from the start subtract the voting station means from the ballot-box level data. Another difference is that instead of plotting the raw voting data (which, with large amounts of data, makes graphs overly crowded and visually less attractive) I’m plotting equal-sized binned means – essentially a scatterplot of grouped data, with groups made up of equally large number of observations (see here for an easy way to implement such grouped scatterplots in Stata).

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Turkey’s Undemocratic Elections

Turkey’s heading for another election, arguably one of its most important so far, as made clear by the unusually vitriolic statements by leading government members (and opposition candidates too, I gather, if the Turkish media reported on them to the same extent), seemingly stumbling over each other to say anything that would make them noticed.

Much ink gets spilled over the main issue at hand this time around: whether the AKP will get the super-majorities required to either unilaterally write a new constitution, or to push one through a referendum. A particular trait of the current constitutional debate is President Erdoğan’s desire for a stronger presidency in Turkey (and one specifically without the checks and balances of, for example, the US). The focus on this issue is quite understandable, as it could change the formal rules of government in the country quite substantially.

A concern, however, is that a too singular focus on Erdoğan and his desire for a presidency draws attention away from what the problem of the current institutional setting really is. And that isn’t parliamentarism as a system of government, as Erdoğan would like his constituency to believe, but the poverty of Turkey’s democracy overall. And while Erdoğan and his AKP government may very well have improved the living standards of its constituency, they have so far failed abysmally in extending the same courtesy to the country’s democratic system.

This post is about one particular segment of Turkey’s institutions: its elections.

Last year, just after the local elections, I wrote a series of blog posts (1, 2, 3) suggesting all was not well with how votes were counted. At that time, although members of the opposition had been complaining about this for a while, this appeared to hit a raw nerve. Within a week of my initial post, my blog had been visiting more than 70,000 times, and the various posts had been cited or linked to in FT, Washington Post, The National Interest, Jadaliyya, Christian Science Monitor, Bloomberg View, Dagens Nyheter, Cumhuriyet (1 2, 3), and Radikal. In the comments section of my blog, pro-government trolls were threatening the election NGO that had shared their data with me, and the “newspaper” Takvim generously nominated me a member of the “banker lobby” together what they perceived to be my main co-belligerents: an Australian media mogule, referred to as “the Jewish Baron”, and a Swedish tycoon, dead since 1938. An unusual week, to say the least.

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